11-18-2009

Beyond Subversive Institutions: Understanding Categorical Factors of State Dismemberment in Europe

Glen M.E. Duerr

Cedarville University, gduerr@cedarville.edu

Beyond Subversive Institutions: Understanding Categorical Factors of State Dismemberment in Europe

Glen M.E. Duerr

Kent State University

Paper prepared for the International Studies Association (ISA) Annual Conference in New

Orleans, Louisiana (17-20 February 2010)

Abstract

As a number of scholars have shown, institutions played a central role in the breakups of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union in the 1990s. This paper builds on that work to explore in greater depth the variations across their experiences, including sub-cases within the former Yugoslavia, especially in the lens of violence accompanying the breakups. It does so by examining these variables: whether the dismemberment was the result of dissolution or secession, whether it was elite or mass-driven and whether and how it was contested. This paper finds that state dissolution produces more peaceful outcomes than the secession of a territory on the periphery. Moreover, mass-driven separatism and unofficial contestation through the use of paramilitary forces increase the level of violence during a contentious state breakup. The conceptual approach in the paper is therefore generalizable and will facilitate understanding of conflict around the world.

Introduction

Across the world the number of new states increased dramatically throughout the twentieth century. Two main factors contributed to this: the recognition of former colonial territories and the breakup of existing states. Even in a continent with a longstanding tradition of state sovereignty such as Europe, significant changes to the Westphalian map occurred. These breakups did not happen all at once but in two waves. [1] The first, running from the start of the twentieth century to the early 1920s brought the independence of Norway in 1905, Finland in 1918, the post-Versailles states in 1919, and Eire (now the Republic of Ireland) in 1921. Removed in time, but similar in substance, was the emergence of an independent Iceland in 1944. A second wave of state proliferation occurred soon after the collapse of communism in 1989. Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union all broke apart, creating twenty-two new states by the start of 1993.

In light of such large-scale changes, it is not surprising that an immense amount of ink has been spilled in an attempt to explain how and why states break apart. A smorgasbord of causes have been hypothesized, including ethnicity (both primordial and constructed), religion, language, power, culture, and social forces.[2]

The recent cases of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union have illuminated a number of these forces and brought another to light: federal institutional structures. Valerie Bunce (1999a, 199b, 2004) describes how these "subversive institutions" create "proto-states," or "states in waiting,"[3] which can emerge as full-blown states under the right circumstances.[4] Crucially, this explanation can make sense of the fact that the breakups took place along the lines of the largest political and geographical entities (union republics in the Soviet Union), rather than that of smaller entities (autonomous republics or regions). After all, other potentially

2

secessionist regions such as Moravia in Czechoslovakia did not break away from the Czech Republic after the latter achieved independence despite some agitation for greater autonomy.[5] Similarly, Chechnya has not seceded from Russia. Federalism may have existed only on paper in the Soviet era, but it heavily influenced the breakups of the Soviet bloc states.

The story, however, is more complicated than that. While the three states broke up along similar administrative lines, the processes that went on though varied in important- and systematic- ways. This paper elucidates the differences and their implications; especially for whether breakups become violent or not. Approached in this manner, the cases of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, yield lessons applicable to the breakup of federations and quasi-federations elsewhere in the world. Two important questions are raised in this paper. Why were the breakups of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union different? And why was there more violence in the case of Yugoslavia?

Theoretical Developments

In this paper there are three main areas of theory that are explored. Essentially, three main points are made in order to bring out a fuller understanding of state breakups and the differing levels of violence across the cases. These three points are then assembled into a typology to answer the above questions. No single theory fits neatly here so a conglomeration of material is most useful to best explain the three central questions of this work. However, there are three different theories that speak to each of the three main points.

The title of this article, *Beyond Subversive Institutions*, is a reference to Valerie Bunce's outstanding work that described the institutional nature of the breakups in Eastern Europe. Basically what this paper adds to the work of Bunce is a more complex definitional

understanding of secession. By introducing the theoretical concept of dissolution as a way in which states can breakup, more can be explained. Moreover, by describing Yugoslavia as a case of four secessions, this provides a greater explanation for the high level of violence in this case.

The nature of Bunce's subversive institutions holds. Her argument of regime collapse holds as well. Quite simply, it was the dynamics between the center and the regions that ultimately caused the differences across the three cases. Dissolution was an option in those cases. Elites in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union opted to dissolve the states in the face of increasing secessionist demands. The creation of a Greater Serbia was the larger goal in Yugoslavia which meant that elites in Yugoslavia attempted to control the state which led to greater secessionist hostility on the periphery. The outcome was reduced to a zero-sum game.

A second area of interest for theory building is Migdal's State-Society links. Migdal argues that with high levels of social control, states can "mobilize their populations, skimming surpluses effectively from society and gaining tremendous strength in facing external foes."[6] Internally, Migdal argues, state personnel can determine the rules of the society should be and they can carry out their preferences. States can increase their level of social control in a scale of three indicators: compliance, participation, and legitimation.[7] When elites are able to display social control over the population, the propensity for state breakups is minimal.

Migdal's theory of social control fits well with the concepts in this paper. On the one hand, a state with strong social control is able to dissolve the state without contestation. The rules and norms set forth by political elites are accepted even if it means changing one of the primary identity's for people in the state: their nationality. On the other hand, a loss of social control speaks to the rise of separatist sentiments. And in the case of Yugoslavia, there were multiple separatist sentiments. The state lost social control over the territory which gave greater

propensity for peripheral units to advocate secession. When Milosevic attempted to assert control over the center, the rules of the game were not seen as legitimate, the regions did not comply, and there was a break in participation.

A third area of theory is Julie Mazzei's *Triad Model* as an explanation for the emergence of paramilitary groups which caused significant levels of violence in the former Yugoslavia. Mazzei argues that a confluence of six conditions in which political elites, economic elites, and security forces join together to provide a sense of legitimacy and impunity; money, land, and supplies; and weapons and training, to the paramilitary group.[8] The six conditions from which paramilitary emergence is likely to occur includes things like limited access to the political system, internal and external pressures from using too much violence, and an inability to deal with a reform movement.

Mazzei's *Triad Model* is useful because it explains that outsourcing violence is a way in which states can undercut reform movements. Moreover, when there are internal and external pressures against state from using violence, a paramilitary can be used to counter criticism and to increase violence. Paramilitary groups may also exhibit more violent features than a standing military because there are more obvious ways to sanction official military personnel upon the cessation of conflict.

This paper adds a seventh possible explanation: cases of secessionism where ethnicity can be mobilized as a reason for subjugating a secessionist population. The state is reluctant to use official modes of violence like the military for fear of outside intervention, but has the overarching goal of retaining national unity.

A Typology of State Dismemberment

The typology, constructed in a four-by-three grid, lays out twelve ways in which a state may breakup (see Table One).[1] In principle, the categories are exhaustive and mutually exclusive, and cases fit in only one cell of the table. Reality, of course, is more complicated, but the table provides a basis for comparing cases in order to explain their relative levels of violence. The table includes three categories of classification explained below: dissolution versus secession, elite versus mass-driven movements, and minimal contestation versus official and unofficial contestation.

Dissolution and Secession

State dismemberment occurs in two ways, through dissolution and secession. While theoretically similar, some categorization shows how breakups have different trajectories which can influence levels of violence. This categorization engages in a discussion of center-periphery relations; dissolution works in one direction whereas secession works in the opposite direction.

Dissolution, by definition, means that the center dissolves entirely creating two or more brand new states.[9] If we take the hypothetical example of state A, in a dissolution state A no longer exists; rather, it is replaced by states B and C (and, if necessary, states D, E and so on).[10]

Secession, in contrast however, is the removal of a territory on the periphery of a state. This means that in our example, state A continues to exist after secession but is joined by state B (and, where applicable, by states C, D and so on). State A diminishes in population, territory size and overall GDP but nonetheless continues to function as a legitimate and viable state.

This delineation between dissolution and secession, despite the clear categorization laid out here, does have some nuances that are worth exploring further. MacCormick (2000), for

---

[1] Some segments of the typology are not likely to happen in real life. Yet for the purposes of an academic typology that is exhaustive, all segments need to be included. For this reason, some boxes have been shaded so as to denote that they are theoretically possible but quite unlikely in real life.

example, may still haggle with my definition of dissolution even though his arguments largely align with the one proposed here.[11] In his work, he is arguing that the cause of separatism in Scotland is not necessarily that of secession, the removal of a peripheral unit from the center. Rather, he is arguing for the dissolution of an agreed union, in this case the dissolution of the 1707 Act of Union between Britain and Scotland. The United Kingdom, however, came together through three major Acts of Union not just one (with Wales, Scotland and Ireland).[12] Dissolving the center, therefore, would require breaking all three Acts of Union just for the sake of Scotland. It is unlikely then that the dissolution of the United Kingdom, as MacCormick argues, can be upheld because dissolution requires the removal of the center and the creation of four units in the specific case of the United Kingdom. For the sake of Scotland alone dissolution cannot occur without the consent of Westminster. Wales and Northern Ireland may be overruled in this hypothetical scenario, like the Central Asian Republics of the Soviet Union as discussed later, but Scotland will likely have to secede as a peripheral unit rather than through the consensual dissolution of the center.[13]

Elite versus Mass-led Movements

Walker Connor (1990) argues that nationalism is a mass phenomenon.[14] In many ways, this assertion is correct because every political movement requires at least some level of popular support. Nationalism does not, contrary to popular opinion, require a majority of the population necessarily to support a movement before it profoundly changes a state (as Hitler's electoral success in 1933 showcases) or leads to its breakup (as the case of Czechoslovakia will show later).

Despite being a mass phenomenon, nationalism has to be driven from somewhere. While this could, in theory, come from virtually anywhere, it can be broken down in one of two

trajectories, elite or mass-driven movements. Stuart Kaufman (2001) delineates between elite and mass-driven separatist movements to show why this trajectory matters. In his four cases, he argues that Moldova and, to some extent, Yugoslavia were elite driven whereas the Karabagh and Georgian conflicts were examples of mass driven movements.[15] Likewise, in another example of mass-driven separatism, Giuliano (2006) describes how Russia managed to quell ethnic secessionist movements throughout the country that were supported from the bottom-up; or, as described in this paper, as mass-driven movements.[16] These cases have significant implications since they infer that elite-driven movements are more likely to result in breakups. Moreover, there are other implications with regards to whether and how much violence will occur.

An elite-driven movement, Kaufman argues, occurs when clear leaders emerge and ramp up their rhetoric against the other. This is perhaps somewhat more controlled than a mass-driven movement because there is at least some level of accountability under international law, rather than simply the work of a rampant mob. The international community sees the leader(s) of a given movement and can identify the source of increased animosity on the part of a group.

The masses, on the other hand, are motivated by fears of the other. When a movement is mass-driven, the elites eventually come onboard as they did in Karabagh and Georgia.[17] Elites support mass-driven movements once they had grown in size; basically, in an attempt to appeal to the electorate and save their own positions. Kaufman's myth-symbol complex is important here because people, especially the masses, respond to their own narratives and the narratives of the other. A mass-driven movement, therefore, requires some activation of the masses as to their position relative to the other. Violence often occurs at mass-driven rallies which are held in response to a larger political problem that is being demonstrated against. It is, for this reason,

that elite versus mass-driven movements are important because mass-driven movements, at least theoretically, lead to more violence.

The role of elites and the masses is important in the breakup of states given their propensity to cause violence. A mass-driven movement may simply descend a given state into anarchy whereby every man, woman or child has to fend for themselves or to somehow gather within their ethnic or religious group and pray for survival.

One further nuance worth acknowledging is that all mass-driven movements do require some level of elite leading to come to fruition. After all, people do not spontaneously show up on the streets to demonstrate; it requires some coordination. The masses, however, can be coordinated from within and it is now conceivable to imagine, through text messaging, that mass driven movements could become easier as communication is facilitated by technological advances. This was evident, for example, in the racial riots in and around Cronulla beach (near Sydney) between White and Middle Eastern (mainly Lebanese-Australian) youths in December of 2005.

Levels of Contestation

The level of contestation in a separatist conflict can help to explain the level of violence associated with the conflict. Some conflicts are fought verbally and can be solved through non-violent means. Other conflicts, however, are contested through violent means. The level of violence in a conflict, though, is not uniform. This can be very difficult to measure accurately, but at a minimum, we can categorize between official and unofficial contestation. The typology, therefore, adopts three different categories of contestation: minimal, official and unofficial.

Minimal contestation occurs when the central government does not violently refute claims for separation. This process, while non-violent, may be contested significantly through

verbal means but it does not utilize violence. Contestation is minimal because the state breakups

eventually and does so without violent contestation from the center. Often there is an incentive

from the international community; either through overt means like threats of military

intervention from the UN or NATO, or covertly through the benefits of potential accession to a

supranational organization like the EU.

Official contestation occurs when the center decides to utilize the military to defend its

borders and to put down rebellion within the state. The military has a uniform, a distinct ranking

system and punishment when the soldiers violate the norms and procedures of war. While the

values and norms of the international community may not always be met, there is accountability,

at least after the cessation of the conflict, because the leaders of the military are easily

identifiable.

Unofficial contestations occur when the center loses its power over the military or said

military is disbanded for some reason. This means that in order to exert control within the state,

the power to do so must be outsourced to paramilitary units who are capable of fulfilling the

broad wishes of the center. Paramilitaries have some distinct disadvantages as compared to an

official military outfit like respect, history and money. They, therefore, have to make up for

these shortcomings which can be done through more ruthless and violent techniques as they are

not explicitly bound to the rules and norms of international law. Paramilitaries may have much

less funding (and therefore may fall apart much more quickly) but this means that they will try to

do more with less when presented with the opportunity. This, in part, may be the lead cause as

to why some conflicts are more violent than others.

A paramilitary may have the tacit support of the government, if not overt funding. The

problem with this, however, is that the center loses much of its control and authority over the

paramilitary group because it is difficult to admonish a loosely unified group. Moreover, it is possible for the center to want a quick cessation to the conflict and not have the ability to stop the activities of the paramilitary group.

Contestation may be more likely when the population of a given territory is significantly heterogeneous, but this is not always the case. Violence does break out in some regions whereas peace prevails in others. Homogeneity, therefore, is not a prerequisite for conflict; only the use of official or unofficial contestation makes a real difference in the propensity for the use of violence and the degree to which violence occurs within a conflict.

PLEASE INSERT TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE

The Likelihood of the Segments in the Typology

The typology helps to lay out important factors that occur in separatist conflicts. Implications can then be drawn from these factors which are presented in a theoretical typology. Reality, as always, is different from a theoretical typology and there are numerous factors that preclude the likelihood of any number of the boxes from being realized in the real world. (The boxes in which the events are theoretically possible but very unlikely in real life are shaded in grey.) It is, for example, difficult to imagine mass-driven dissolution because it would almost require a spontaneous street demonstration by a large number of people from all ethnic groups in the state (or at least two of them). The masses would then have to remove the political elites, decide that the state was dissolving and then effectively declare independence for the two or more regions within the former country.

It is also hard to imagine official contestation in an elite-driven dissolution given the fact that the military would have to overrule the governing elites. This is not entirely infeasible as some military forces across the world serve a gatekeeper type function for democratic

11

governance (like Turkey for example). Nonetheless, some boxes in the typology are more widely used than others as evidenced by tables three through six which showcase the likely segments of the typology.

Propensity for Violence

The propensity for violence is an important factor in any decision to alter the borders of a state. In Table Two below, the propensity for violence is assessed in each box. The trend is that violence increases as the typology moves from left-to-right and from top-to-bottom. In all cases, violence increases as the level of contestation increases shown from top-to-bottom in the typology. Further, violence increases as the masses make decisions rather than the elites and attempts are made to secede from the periphery rather than dissolve the center, left-to-right in the typology. This is a significant trend that is exposed by the categorization of the three cases and one that may well assist in decreasing the level of violence in conflicts across the world.

PLEASE INSERT TABLE TWO ABOUT HERE

National Independence in Europe in the 1990s

Soon after the collapse of Communism in 1989, the three federations of Eastern Europe all broke-up whereas the six remaining unitary states did not. This precluded a slew of works that attempted to explain this phenomenon. Bunce and found that states broke up along institutional lines providing independence for any large unit within the former state.

While not necessarily evident at the time, the three federal states in Eastern Europe came under increasing pressures of nationalist claims whereas as the six more unitary states had less nationalist pressures. Table Three below is an attempt to illustrate where nascent separatist

movements in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union stood in 1989. Each movement was, more or less, in the early stages. However, as can be seen below, the major issue was that of secession, the removal of a peripheral unit from the center. Violence was still a distinct possibility in all three cases even though we know now that two of the three states broke-up in largely peaceful ways. In this regard, hindsight is twenty-twenty, but in reality violence was a very real possibility at the time. Only through a shift in thinking could violence really be avoided in all three of the cases, not just Yugoslavia.

PLEASE INSERT TABLE THREE ABOUT HERE

As Table Three illustrates, in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia there was minimal separatist contestation in 1989 (although there were increasing fears in Yugoslavia). However, in the Soviet Union, the military had already been utilized especially in the Baltics to decrease some of the more overt nationalist agitation. This happened despite Gorbachev's desire to keep the peace and not to use military force.[18]

Furthermore, as evidenced by the shift to Table Four from Table Three, each of the states changes from one box on the typology to another. It is important to note at this juncture that each movement was somewhat nascent at this stage but as time went on, each situation changed quickly. This means that the separatist movements developed a response with regards to changes of the center. As illustrated in Table Four, both Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union dissolve when the center decides that the union is no longer viable whereas in Yugoslavia, the center contests the removal of regions of the periphery, albeit to different effects.

PLEASE INSERT TABLE FOUR ABOUT HERE

As evidenced in Table Three and Table Four, delineating between 1989 and approximately 1995, twenty-two new states were created out of the three former states. What then happened

between these years that led to the creation of all these new states? Can their respective

breakups tell us anything about the propensity for violence? In this next section, I shall evaluate

the cases in order of least violent to most violent and attempt to explain what implications can be

drawn from the categorization laid out in the typology and why the shifts took place within the

typology.

        Czechoslovakia, 1993

The cleanest of the three breakups in Eastern Europe came after the initial transition to

democracy in the region. Indeed, Czechoslovakia looked as if it would become the model of

democratic transition in Central and Eastern Europe after two successful elections in 1990 and

1992. Czechoslovakia had successfully fulfilled the minimum criterion for democracy of

regular, free and fair elections in the aftermath of the transition. Furthermore, with significant

economic reforms and foreign direct investment, the country was fast becoming a suitable

candidate for EU and NATO membership.[19]

        Czechoslovakia, created in 1918 in the aftermath of World War One, was a partnership

between two peoples: Czech and Slovak. The Czechs had known independence historically in

the time of the Bohemian kingdom which lasted until 1620.[20] In contrast, the Slovaks, upon the

creation of Czechoslovakia, had never been part of a political-administrative unit.[21] With the

creation of Czechoslovakia, both parties however gained independence from foreign rule. The

Czechs were able to free themselves of Austrian rule and the Slovaks were freed of Hungarian

control.[22] This new state amalgamated the Czech Lands (Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia) with

Slovakia and Ruthenia[23] to create a country that would more closely resemble national self-

determination and move away from the conceptualization of empire.

Czechoslovakia, as it stood in 1989 after the Velvet Revolution ended Communist rule, was a country of fifteen million people split roughly on a ratio of two to one between Czechs and Slovaks.[24] Both Czech and Slovak areas remained significantly homogenous throughout their seven decades together. In line with Bunce's argument, these two parts effectively formed "states in waiting." When Czechoslovakia then transitioned to democracy with the Velvet Revolution, it brought with it the same electoral setup it had under Communism.[25] Czechoslovakia had been democratic before World War Two and thus had some experience with democratic procedures. However, with the nuanced bifederative system in place, it proved difficult to govern the country effectively. After all, the central bicameral houses, the House of the People and House of the Nations could easily be circumvented. Since a three-fifths majority was required to enact constitutional change, each house could effectively veto any constitutional change with only thirty disruptive deputies.[26]

The dissolution of Czechoslovakia on 1 January 1993 caused many to reflect on the differences between the two sides that led to the "Velvet Divorce."[27] Further, it became apparent even well before the beginning of the 1993 that the two sides would divorce.[28] Dissolving the state, in a congenial manner, was less expected but the incentives from the international community, especially with regards to possible EU membership, helped to keep contestation to a minimum.

The case of Czechoslovakia, therefore, would fit into the upper left box of the typology: elite-led dissolution that was uncontested. In the lead up to the Velvet Divorce, only 16 percent of the people actually supported the partition of the state[29] which strongly suggests that political elites were responsible for driving the movement. Moreover, since no referendum was actually staged, it becomes quite clear again that the elites decided the fate of Czechoslovakia. In rare

incidences in the literature, academics use the term dissolution[30] but almost all, at bare

minimum, describe the removal of the center, the end of the former state and the creation of two

new independent states even if they do not use the actual term, dissolution. Much can be

inferred from the use of the term dissolution because it may help to better explain the lack of

violence. Dissolutions that are agreed upon at the highest level may be more peaceful provided

that neoliberal institutional safeguards such as the potential for EU and NATO membership

exist.[31] All of this upholds Migdal's conceptualization of social control. Violence did not break

out in this example of dissolution even though a majority of citizens still wanted a state called

Czechoslovakia.

The importance of listing the Czechoslovak case as dissolution is that the prominent

literature does not carefully consider the difference between dissolution and secession. Even

amongst some of the most prominent authors of the Czechoslovak dissolution, classification of

what exactly happens is in doubt. Young (1995), for example, considers the Czechoslovak case

to be merely peaceful secession as it would relate to Quebec's secessionist claims in Canada.[32]

The problem, however, is that Quebecois secession is based on a peripheral territory trying to

break with the center. Kraus and Stranger (2000) use the term dissolution in the subtitle of their

edited volume but, throughout the book, the terms secession and dissolution are used

interchangeably.[33] In Musil's (1995) edited volume, neither dissolution nor secession is used

rather the term, breakup, is utilized throughout the work.[34] This is, perhaps, a good explanation

of what happened but does not provide the reader with any real substantive definition. It is also a

very good reason as to why authors have had difficulty explaining the different levels of

violence when examining the other cases: Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

Soviet Union, 1991

The formal end of the Soviet Union came on 8 December 1991 at the Minsk Conference when

Russia, along with Belarus and Ukraine, opted to withdraw from the union (also known as the

Belavezah Accords). This act effectively signaled the end of the Soviet Union which dissolved

the state and granted full independence to union republics. Independence was granted to both

union republics that had been agitating for it as in the Baltics and Caucasus and even to those

that had not as in Central Asia (although the other states officially opted out of the union later in

December 1991 with the signing of the Almaty Accords). While active separatist movements

existed and held successful referenda on independence, they could not be considered

independent states until the Soviet Union dissolved.[35] After all, the union wide referendum on

the continued existence of the Soviet Union supported the union in March of 1991.[36] Once

again, the Soviet case of dissolution upholds Migdal's concept of social control. The citizens

accepted the outcome of the elite decision to dissolve the state even though they had voted in

favor of it just ten months before.

Again, as in the Czechoslovak case, the literature falls short of adequately explaining

precisely how the state broke up and how this influenced violence in the country. Perhaps the

two most prominent explanations of the Soviet breakup, Suny's *Revenge of the Past* and

Beissinger's *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State*, both provide strong

explanations of what happened. However, in the area of categorization, both do not adequately

show how the Soviet Union fell apart and why violence was significant in some circumstances

and not at others.

Suny (1993) argues that mass-driven nationalist movements were responsible for the

breakup of the USSR given historical allegiances that while constructed, were integral to the

people in each of the fifteen union republics.[37] This is true, to some extent, but the Soviet Union

17

did not fall apart until the center dissolved. After all, the various referenda held in the union republics did not grant them independence.[38] If Suny's argument is correct, therefore, the mass-driven independence movements would have been legitimated by obtaining independence *before* Russia withdrew from the federation which effectively dissolved the Soviet Union. This, however, did not happen and Suny's argument, while clearing a lot of land, only captures part of the story.

In Beissinger (2002), the argument focuses on what seemed impossible in 1987 became inevitable in 1991.[39] Beissinger points to a tidal wave of nationalism that became overwhelming and led to the inevitable collapse of the Soviet Union. This argument, in many regards, comes very close but does not quite encapsulate the whole story. Indeed, as Beissinger admits, "no states within the world community recognized the sovereignty claims of separatist movements within the union republics."[40] He, therefore, like Suny, does not quite find the pivotal point at which mass-driven separatist movements were trumped by an elite-driven Russian dissolution which brought about the independence of all fifteen union republics not just those that agitated for independence.

Other authors, in line with Bunce, recognize the importance of institutions in the breakup of the Soviet Union. Roeder (1991) and Hale (2005), for example, both see the importance of institutional design in the creation of new states. Both authors also correctly note that the Soviet Union broke up through dissolution rather than secession. In Roeder, the institutional setup of the Soviet Union precluded the dissolution of the state and became instruments of assertion.[41] In Hale, the institutional design of the Soviet Union facilitated its dissolution which is why Russia has stayed together despite similar issues with ethno-federalism.[42] Both provide compelling arguments here but their analysis of violence, however, still could be built upon further.

Roeder's acknowledgment that the Soviet Union dissolved adds clout to his argument but he does not delineate as to when the secessionist movements were trumped by Russian led dissolution at the Minsk Conference. This would help to explain some of the violence in the Baltics and Caucasus since numerous demonstrations were ongoing and secession was contested.[43] However, in this line of thinking, why did violent contestation stop after December 1991? Dissolution, even in contested situations, is likely to be less violent than mass-driven secessionist movements that were increasing in size in the Baltics and elsewhere.

Hale's argument, differentiating between the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the continuation of Russia as a test case, is a good one. It does not, however, have the luxury of viewing the Russian state over time the way scholars have been able to examine the Soviet Union. Simply put, it took the Soviet Union seventy-four years to dissolve, how then can we be sure that the same thing will not happen in Russia with only seventeen years of study? After all, predictions in the social sciences can be perilous as evidenced by Gail Lapidus' (1984) argument that the Soviet Union was not likely to break apart.[44] Lapidus should certainly be forgiven for her shortcomings here as the situation changed significantly with Gorbachev's reforms in 1986.

Hale's central argument that a united core region increases fears on the part of minority which increases separatist demands[45] is correct and definitely adds to scholarly understanding but should better classify the differences between the Soviet Union and Russia. It is, as Hale notes, a natural comparison, but a significant discussion that would add to his comparison should further extrapolate the relations between the center and the periphery. The dissolution of the Soviet Union came from the center whereas current secessionist movements in Russia come from the periphery. Hale argues the division of the core region, in some senses a synonym for center in this work, prevents secession. Not so, the division of the core prevents dissolution. A

republic on the periphery may still, in time, secede from Russia given the right circumstances but the state will not likely dissolve if the core is divided. Moreover, demographic changes make a significant difference such that comparing the Soviet Union, composed of 53 percent ethnic Russians, with Russia, composed of approximately 83 percent ethnic Russians, is more difficult. The chances of dissolution given these demographic differences are much less in Russia because of the overwhelming demographic advantage of ethnic Russians. Secession is, therefore, the more likely mode of national self-determination which can still happen especially if this case is viewed over time.

   Yugoslavia, 1991-1995

Yugoslavia, a state that came together originally as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918, was made up of six different republics and two autonomous regions.[46] The country was relatively peaceful for much of its history despite periodic ethnic clashes and functioned, for the most part, normally. It fell apart, however, in the 1990s through a mix of rising nationalism and fears of the other which led to numerous ethnic conflicts between some of the six republics and one autonomous region, Kosovo.[47] As Yugoslavia edged towards war, the elites became more prominent in the process. Tudjman emerged in Croatia as did Izbetgovic in Bosnia to counter the rhetoric of Milosevic; the center was losing social control over the territory. This was a significant change and a reason why Yugoslavia shifts from the mass-driven category in 1989 (Table Three) to the elite-driven category in 1995 (Table Four).

  One major difference between Yugoslavia and the cases of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union was the nature of the constitutional arrangement. Yugoslavia was much more confederal whereas the other two arrangements were federal.[48] This essentially means that the republics, in theory, were supposed to have more power than the center in Yugoslavia. Both

federal and confederal arrangements are comparatively loose when compared to unitary or union states, but confederalism implies an even looser structure than federalism.

Another important factor within the Yugoslav conflict was the quick disintegration of the Yugoslav military early on in the first war in Slovenia when the forces splintered and refused to fight.[49] The conflict, therefore, was in many ways left up to smaller paramilitary groups often composed of younger disenfranchised men from soccer supporters groups.[50] These paramilitary groups fought under the direction of political elites and evidence of unofficial cooperation between Milosevic and Arkan's Tigers was confirmed by a former secretary.[51] In many regards, however, they had a great deal of autonomy with what they did, who they killed and the level of gruesomeness.

As in the cases of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, the wider literature comes close to defining what actually happened but needs further categorization. Yugoslavia, to be fair, is a difficult case given its time frame and the changes that occurred. Categorizing everything that happened is difficult and there is some debate in the literature. It is, however, important to go through what has been said and try to provide some clarity.

Bookman (1992) discusses the economic impact of secession and describes the cases of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia as state unraveling.[52] She argues that when more than one secessionist movement succeeds, the state unravels rather than classifying it, as I do, as two or more territories seceding.[53] The reason I classify it as secession is because the center dissolved in the Soviet Union creating fifteen new states without the emergence of a rump Soviet Union (although the C.I.S. was an attempt to do so). After Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia seceded, however, a rump Yugoslavia was left that retained this name. While the name did change at a later date, the center remained in tact and the old Yugoslavia continued.

To be fair to Bookman, she does acknowledge that her difficulty in classifying the Yugoslav case and furthermore her book was published before the case was finished and thus she should be forgiven for the ambiguity of the time.

Ramet (1992) on the other hand, recognizes that secession took place amongst four of the republics in Yugoslavia.[54] The inability of the initial six republics to solve the national question in a de facto confederal state, in many ways, led to the secession of four republics in the early 1990s. Like Bookman, her issue is that it is written before the real conclusion of the conflict and, therefore, she is unaware of the continuation of a rump Yugoslavia after the fact and so a real definition of what happened still escaped her. This is a relatively minor issue and her classification is still largely correct.

Lampe (2000) describes the dissolution of Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s; something that was discovered later after the initial wars in Slovenia and Croatia in 1991.[55] The categorical concern with this, however, was that two republics: Serbia and Montenegro and two autonomous units: Vojvodina and Kosovo remained within a rump Yugoslavia until 2003 as part of an EU brokered deal that created the union of Serbia and Montenegro.[56] Once again, categorization is an issue because the state did not dissolve; secession had occurred in four of the republics.

PLEASE INSERT TABLE FIVE ABOUT HERE

Among other things, my typology delineating between the levels of contestation shows that a case like Yugoslavia cannot be lumped together as one state breakup. While the four peripheral parts: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and FYR Macedonia, each seceded from the center after the elites took over political leadership of the respective movements, the case should be much more clearly delineated. In FYR Macedonia, the international community was quite concerned with war spilling over into South-East Europe and causing a wider conflict.

There was, therefore, an incentive for Milosevic to not contest the secession of FYR Macedonia which is why contestation was minimal. In Slovenia, a brief war between Slovene forces and the Yugoslav military ended after only ten days culminating in a swift victory for Slovenia.[57] Milosevic's contestation in Slovenia, therefore, was official and after the decisive Slovenian victory, their independence was recognized and Milosevic turned his attention to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Since the Yugoslav army (JNA) consisted of members from all republics, the military, as opposed to original design, disbanded soon into the fighting. While the JNA did continue to function in some form as a Serb army, the conflicts between Milosevic and Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, were both increasingly outsourced to paramilitary groups such as Arkan's Tigers.[58] Arkan, as evidenced by Mazzei's *Triad Model* had political support and legitimacy from Milosevic, economic support from the state and Serb supporters, and weapons and training from existing security force structures.[59] This unofficial contestation allowed Milosevic to claim some level of impunity (albeit in theory) since much of the violence was caused by paramilitaries. This also provides real credence as to why Yugoslavia was so violent.

After Croatia's independence was recognized in 1992 and the conflict between the rest of Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina concluded with the Dayton Accords in 1995, a rump Yugoslavia still remained. Montenegro, the last remaining republic outside of Serbia began agitating for independence. In 2002, after several years of Montenegrin agitation, the EU-brokered Belgrade Agreement placed a moratorium on a potential Montenegrin referendum for three years and changed the name of the state from Yugoslavia to the union of Serbia and Montenegro.[60]

The Dissolution of Serbia-Montenegro, 2006

The dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro in 2006 brought to a close the ongoing the dispute between the two remaining republics of rump Yugoslavia. While it may be argued that Montenegro held a referendum and seceded as a peripheral territory from Serbia and the autonomous regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina, the actual outcome of the Montenegrin referendum was not fully resolved until both Montenegro and Serbia declared their respective independence in early June 2006.[61] In fact, Serbia declared independence two days after Montenegro thus legitimizing the dissolution of the union. This provided a much more peaceful outcome for two reasons. First, the EU monitored the election and required that Montenegrin support exceed fifty-five percent which, while somewhat arbitrary, was expected to keep the peace.[62] Second, the Serbian military, when gauging the morale of their troops, opted not to wage a violent war against Montenegro.[63] The dissolution of the state, therefore, allowed Serbia and Montenegro to divide peacefully despite the constant fear of violence in the Balkans.

While the case of Montenegrin independence, by some, may be argued as a case of secession, the dissolution of Serbia-Montenegro has much in common with Norway-Sweden in 1905.[64] The breakup had much more legitimacy and was not contested because it was a mutually agreed upon dissolution rather than a disputed secession. In the case of Norway, after entering into a personal union with Sweden in 1814 albeit with significant resistance, the Norwegians had significant autonomy.[65] However, with the establishment of a more true democratic system in 1884, the Norwegians increasingly agitated for independence. In 1905, they held a referendum which received overwhelming support.[66] This, however, did not legitimate their independence which only came after the Swedes agreed to let them go. In this era, the Swedes were a much more aggressive people and had fought wars in the nineteenth century. Likewise, when Montenegro held a referendum in 2006, it was legitimated by a

successful vote and some recognition in the international community but it was not until Serbia

recognized Montenegro that the UN allowed for their membership and full independence. In this

way, the union was peacefully dissolved and Serbia-Montenegro was replaced by two

independent states: Serbia and Montenegro. This can be contrasted with the secession of Kosovo

that has had significant contestation and the final outcome is not yet clear at the time of writing.

PLEASE INSERT TABLE SIX ABOUT HERE

The case of Montenegro, therefore, as Table Six shows, outlines how an elite-driven dissolution

with minimal contestation led to little violence even in the fissiparous Balkans region. Through

international incentives, dissolution became possible and while it may be true that Serb troops

had little morale in 2000, paramilitary groups may have stepped in and violence could still have

ensued.

Conclusion

The breakups of Czechoslovakia, Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia showcase how states that are

similar in many ways can diverge so greatly in the nature of their breakups and the level of

violence associated with them. My typology is an attempt to explain these phenomena and

presents a way to think systematically about breakups.

Bunce (1999a, 1999b, 2004) argues that the three breakups in Eastern Europe occurred

along ethnofederal lines and were resultant of subversive institutions.[67] In this way she cleared a

lot of land. This paper builds on that foundation to explore in greater depth the variations across

their experiences, including sub-cases within the former Yugoslavia, especially in the lens of

violence accompanying the breakups. It does so by examining these variables: whether the

dismemberment was the result of dissolution or secession, whether it was elite or mass-driven

and whether and how it was contested. This paper finds that state dissolution produces more

peaceful outcomes than the secession of a territory on the periphery. Moreover, mass-driven separatism and unofficial contestation through the use of a paramilitary forces increase the level of violence during a contentious state breakup. The conceptual approach in the paper is generalizable and will help understand and limit conflict around the world, especially in scenarios where territory is contested and the breakup of a state is likely.

This paper, therefore, has wide ranging implications. Not only is it important to European conflicts, it can be used in cases throughout the world. Furthermore, as the case of Yugoslavia elucidates, a given conflict can last for considerable time and should be thought of as sub-cases if the conflict continues in the long term, piecing together past conflicts if necessary. This paper also makes a definitional amendment to Bunce's work on subversive institutions, upholds Migdal's concept of social control, and advances in a small way Mazzei's work on paramilitary group emergence.

Perhaps the most overarching contribution of this paper is to further discuss elite-driven dissolution. Dissolving a state is not a good outcome under normal circumstances. However, in situations where the political conflict is becoming more like a zero-sum violent conflict, the option of dissolution may cauterize some conflicts outright and even help to reduce violence where widespread conflict was expected. If nothing else, it will give the respective parties one more option at the negotiating table.

References

Anderson, B. (1983) *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.

BBC News. Profile: Serbia and Montenegro. Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1039269.stm

Beissinger, M.R. (2002) *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bookman, M.Z. (1992) *The Economics of Secession*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Breuilly, J. (1982) *Nationalism and the State*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Bunce, V. (1999a) *Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bunce, V. (1999b) Peaceful versus Violent State Dismemberment: A Comparison of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. *Politics & Society*, 27, pp. 217-237.

Bunce, V. (2004) Federalism, Nationalism and Secession: The Communist and Post-communist Experience, in Amoretti, U.M. & Bermeo, N. (Eds.), *Federalism and Territorial Cleavages*. (pp. 417-440). Baltimore, MD: Johns-Hopkins University.

Connor, W. (1990) When is a Nation? *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 13(1), pp. 92-103.

Cornell, S.E. (2002) Autonomy as a Source of Conflict. *World Politics*, 54, pp. 245-276.

Darmanovic, S. (2007) Montenegro: A miracle in the Balkans? *Journal of Democracy* 18(2), pp. 152-159.

Derry, T.K. (1957) *A Short History of Norway*. London: George Allen and Unwin Limited

Duerr, G. (2009) Peaceful and Mutual Parliamentary Dissolution, *Sprawy Narodowsciowe*, 35, pp. 29-47.

Foer, F. (2004) *How Soccer Explains the World: An Unlikely Theory of Globalization*. New York: Harper-Collins.

Gellner, E. (1983) *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Hale, H.E. (2005) The Make-Up and Break-up of Ethnofederal States: Why Russia Survives Where the USSR Fell. *Perspectives on Politics* 3(1), pp. 55-70.

Huntington, S. (1991) *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.

Jacoby, W. (2004) *The Enlargement of the European Union and NATO: Ordering from the Menu in Central Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Judah, T. (2000) *The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Kaufman, S. (2001) *Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Kovac, D. (2002) The Slovak Political Agenda in the 19th and Early 20th Century: From L'udevit Stur to Czech-Slovak Statehood. In Ramet, S., Felak, J.R. & Ellison, H.J. (Eds.), *Nations and Nationalisms in East-Central Europe, 1806-1948*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Kraus, M. & Stranger, A. (Eds.), (2000) *Irreconcilable Differences? Explaining Czechoslovakia's Dissolution*. Lanham, MA: Rowman and Littlefield.

Lampe, J.R. (2000) *Yugoslavia as History: Twice there was a Country* (2nd edition). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lapidus, G. (1984) Ethnonationalism and Political Stability: The Soviet Case. *World Politics* 36, pp. 555-580.

MacCormick, N. (2000) Is there a Constitutional Path to Scottish Independence? *Parliamentary Affairs* 53, pp. 721-736.

Mazower, M. (2000) *The Balkans: A Short History*. New York: Random House.

Mazzei, J. (2009) *Death Squads or Self-Defense Forces? How Paramilitary Groups Emerge and Challenge Democracy in Latin America*, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press

McGarry, J. and O'Leary, B. (2005) Federation as a Model of Ethnic Conflict Regulation. In Noel, S. (Ed.). *From Power to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies*. Montreal, QC: McGill-Queens University Press.

Migdal, J. (1988) *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Mueller, J. (2000) The Banality of "Ethnic War." *International Security* 25(1), pp. 42-70.

Musil, J. (Ed.). (1995) *The End of Czechoslovakia*. New York: Central European

University Press.

Pearcy, G.E. (1977) *World Sovereignty*. Fullerton, CA: Plycon Press.

Popperwell, R.G. (1972) *Norway*. London: Ernest Benn Limited.

Ramet, S.P. (1992*) Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991* (2nd edition). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Roeder, P.G. (1991) Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization. *World Politics* 43(2), pp. 196-232.

Sambanis, N. (2000) Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature. *World Politics* 52(4), pp. 437-483.

Skalnik Leff, C. (1997) *The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation versus State*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Skalnik Leff, C. (1999) Democratization and Disintegration in Multinational States: The Breakup of the Communist Federations. *World Politics*, 51, pp. 205-235.

Smith, A.D. (1991) *National Identity*. Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press.

Suny, R.G. (1993) *The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution and the Collapse of the Soviet Union*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Svec, M. (1992) Czechoslovakia's 'Velvet Divorce.' *Current History*, 91, pp. 376-380.

White, S., Gill, G, and Slider, D. (1993) *The Politics of Transition: Shaping a Post-Soviet Future*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Wolchik, S.L. (1995) 'The Politics of Transition and the Break-Up of Czechoslovakia,' in Musil, J. (Ed.). *The End of Czechoslovakia*. (pp. 225-244). New York: Central European University Press.

Young, R. (1995) *The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada*. Montreal, QC: McGill-Queens University Press.

Table One: A Typology of Violence and State breakups

	Elite-driven Dissolution	**Mass-driven Dissolution**	**Elite-driven Secession**	**Mass-driven Secession**
Minimal Contestation	-The center opts to dissolve the state and becomes a set of completely new entities through an elite led movement which is uncontested by the various parts	-The center opts to dissolve the state and becomes a set of completely new entities which is uncontested by the various parts	-The periphery attempts to break away from the center with little contestation	-The periphery attempts to break away from the center with little contestation
Official Contestation (Army)	-The center opts to dissolve the state but the army steps in to stop this from happening thereby disobeying the elites	-The center opts to dissolve the state but the army steps in to stop this from happening thereby disobeying the elites, on account of mass-led demonstrations	-The periphery attempts to break away from the center but is contested by the army controlled by the center	-The periphery attempts to break away from the center but is contested by the army controlled by the center
Unofficial Contestation (Paramilitary)	-The center opts to dissolve the state but rogue elements within the state fight for its survival	-The center opts to dissolve the state but rogue elements within the state fight for its survival usually from amongst the masses	-The periphery attempts to secede from the center disbands the military given the heterogeneous nature of the state so the center creates a paramilitary to contest the secessionist movement	-The periphery attempts to secede from the center disbands the military given the heterogeneous nature of the state so the center creates a paramilitary to contest the secessionist movement

Table Two: Levels of Violence in the Typology

	Elite-driven Dissolution	Mass-driven Dissolution	Elite-driven Secession	Mass-driven Secession
Minimal Contestation	-Minimal violence	-Minimal violence	-Minimal violence but agitation could occur between laypersons	-Violence is more likely given the nature of mass-led movements and, therefore, clashes between rival groups are increasingly likely
Official Contestation (Military)	-Minimal violence given the instruction of political elites	-Minimal violence given the instruction of political elites	-The military challenges the seceding party and violence erupts	-The military challenges the seceding party and violence erupts
Unofficial Contestation (Paramilitary)	-Some violence could occur in a hypothetical situation but is unlikely	-Some violence could occur in a hypothetical situation but is unlikely	-Heavy violence is likely as the government outsources its violence to paramilitary groups who have limited accountability	-Heavy violence in a situation that is now anarchical, paramilitary activities are rampant and heavy casualties are inflicted

Table Three: Eastern Europe, circa 1989

	Elite-driven Dissolution	Mass-driven Dissolution	Elite-driven Secession	Mass-driven Secession
Minimal Contestation			-**Czechoslovakia:** Some very minor Slovak agitation	-**Yugoslavia:** Increased fears from Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia with regards to Milosevic's overtures
Official Contestation				-**Soviet Union:** Significant secessionist agitation in the Baltics, Georgia and the Ukraine
Unofficial Contestation				

Table Four: Eastern Europe, circa 1995

	Elite-drive Dissolution	Mass-driven Dissolution	Elite-driven Secession	Mass-driven Secession
Minimal Contestation	-**Czechoslovakia:** split into Czech and Slovak Republics peacefully -**Soviet Union:** Russia withdraws from the Soviet Union thus dissolving the center and granting independence to the fifteen union republics		-**Macedonia:** Due to international constraints, Macedonia is granted independence with minimal contestation	
Official Contestation			-**Slovenia:** The Yugoslav army contests the secession of Slovenia but loses a quick war and allows for their secession	
Unofficial Contestation			-**Yugoslavia:** Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina both become independent after significant conflicts	

Table Five: Clarifying the Yugoslav breakup

	Elite-driven Dissolution	Mass-driven Dissolution	Elite-driven Secession	Mass-driven Secession
Minimal Contestation			-**Macedonia:** Due to international constraints, Macedonia is granted independence with minimal contestation	
Official Contestation			-**Slovenia:** The Yugoslav army contests the secession of Slovenia but loses a quick war and allows for their secession	
Unofficial Contestation			-**Yugoslavia:** Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina both become independent after significant conflicts	

Table Six: The Dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro, 2006

	Elite-driven Dissolution	Mass-driven Dissolution	Elite-driven Secession	Mass-driven Secession
Minimal Contestation	-**Serbia and Montenegro**: After a successful referendum in Montenegro and a declaration of independence, the Serbs capitulate, declare independence themselves and allow for the dissolution of the union			
Official Contestation				
Unofficial Contestation				

Endnotes

[1] The term 'wave' is borrowed from Samuel Huntington's (1991) work on waves of democracy.

[2] See Smith, A.D. (1991) *National Identity*. Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press; Anderson, B. (1983) *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso; Breuilly, J. (1982) *Nationalism and the State*. New York: St. Martin's Press; Gellner, E. (1983) *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, among others.

[3] Bunce, V. (1999a) *Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Bunce, V. (1999b) Peaceful versus Violent State Dismemberment: A Comparison of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. *Politics & Society*, 27(2); Bunce, V. (2004) Federalism, Nationalism and Secession: The Communist and Post-communist Experience. In Ugo Amoretti, and N. Bermeo, (Eds.), *Federalism and Territorial Cleavages*. Baltimore, MD: Johns-Hopkins University.

[4] Other scholars make similar claims. See Suny, R. (1993) *The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution and the Collapse of the Soviet Union*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press; Skalnik Leff, C. (1999) Democratization and Disintegration in Multinational States: The Breakup of the Communist Federations. *World Politics*, 51, 205-235; Cornell, S.E. (2002) Autonomy as a Source of Conflict. *World Politics*, 54

[5] Wolchik, S.L. (1995) The Politics of Transition and the Break-Up of Czechoslovakia. In Musil, J. (Ed.), *The End of Czechoslovakia*. New York: Central European University Press, 234

[6] Migdal, J. (1988) *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 32

[7] Ibid, p.32

[8] Mazzei, J. (2009) *Death Squads or Self-Defense Forces? How Paramilitary Groups Emerge and Challenge Democracy in Latin America*, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, p. 16-23.

[9] Duerr, G. (2009) Peaceful and Mutual Parliamentary Dissolution. *Sprawy Narodowosciowe* 35: 32-33; Sambanis, N. (2000) Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature. *World Politics* 52(4); MacCormick, N. (2000) Is there a Constitutional Path to Scottish Independence? *Parliamentary Affairs* 53

[10] While Sambanis and MacCormick provided the impetus for the discussion of dissolution, the definition, as it is stated in the paper, is mine.

[11] MacCormick, 732

[12] The Republic of Ireland seceded from the union in 1921; however, Northern Ireland remained with the United Kingdom and retained the 1800 Act of Union.

[13] MacCormick, 735

[14] Connor, W. (1990) When is a Nation? *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 13(1)

[15] Kaufman, S. (2001) *Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

[16] Giuliano, E. (2006) Secessionism from the Bottom-up: Democratization, Nationalism and Local Accountability in the Russian Transition. *World Politics*, 58

[17] Kaufman describes the cases of Karabagh and Georgia in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively.

[18] Suny, 1993; Roeder, P.G. (1991) Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization. *World Politics* 43(2)

[19] Jacoby, W. (2004) *The Enlargement of the European Union and NATO: Ordering from the Menu in Central Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

[20] Kraus, M. & Stranger, A. (Eds.), *Irreconcilable Differences? Explaining Czechoslovakia's Dissolution*. Lanham, MA: Rowman and Littlefield, 2.

[21] Kovac, D. (2002) The Slovak Political Agenda in the 19th and Early 20th Century: From L'udevit Stur to Czech-Slovak Statehood. In Ramet, S. et al. (Eds.), *Nations and Nationalisms in East-Central Europe, 1806-1948*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

[22] Young, R. (1995) *The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada*. Montreal, QC: McGill-Queens University Press, 146; Pearcy, G.E. (1977) *World Sovereignty*, Fullerton, CA: Plycon Press, 195.

[23] Ruthenia is also known as Carpathian Ukraine that was annexed by the Soviet Union in 1944.

[24] Skalnik Leff, C. (1997) *The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation versus State*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

[25] McGarry, J. & O'Leary, B. (2005) Federation as a Model of Ethnic Conflict Regulation. In Noel, S. (Ed.). *From Power to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies*. Montreal, QC: McGill-Queens University Press.

[26] A discussion of the nature of the Czechoslovak political system can be found in Skalnik Leff, *The Czech and Slovak Republics* and Musil, *The End of Czechoslovakia*.

[27] Some of the major works on the "Velvet Divorce" include: Kraus & Stranger, *Irreconcilable Differences?*; Skalnik Leff, *The Czech and Slovak Republics*; Musil, J. (Ed.), *The End of Czechoslovakia*. New York: Central European University Press; Svec, M. (1992) Czechoslovakia's 'Velvet Divorce.' *Current History*, 91

[28] Svec, 376-380

[29] Skalnik Leff, (1997), 138-9

[30] Both Kraus and Stranger, *Irreconcilable Differences?* and Svec, "Czechoslovakia's 'Velvet Divorce'," 376-380 describe dissolution in various ways but their definition of what happened in Czechoslovakia is somewhat ambiguous.

[31] A fuller discussion of this point can be found in Jacoby, *The Enlargement of the European Union and NATO* in which the case of Czechoslovakia is discussed in light of EU accession.

[32] Young, 146

[33] In different chapters of Kraus and Stranger's edited volume, *Irreconcilable Differences?* different terms are used to describe the breakup of Czechoslovakia.

[34] Likewise in Musil's edited volume, *The End of Czechoslovakia*, the same definitional problem holds as it did with Kraus and Stranger's volume.

[35] For a full compilation of referenda in the Soviet Union prior to dissolution, please see S. White et al., *The Politics of Transition: Shaping a Post-Soviet Future*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 89

[36] White S. et al., *The Politics of Transition*, 89.

[37] In this way, Suny laid part of the foundation for Bunce with regards to state breakups along ethnofederal lines.

[38] Numerous union republics in the Baltics and Caucasus held successful referenda but no state in the international community was willing to recognize them for fear of the Soviet Union.

[39] Beissinger, M. (2002) *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

[40] Beissinger, 445

[41] Roeder, "Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization," 199

[42] Hale, H.E. (2005) The Make-Up and Break-up of Ethnofederal States: Why Russia Survives Where the USSR Fell. *Perspectives on Politics*, 3(1), 55-8

[43] Roeder, 199

[44] Lapidus, G. (1984) Ethnonationalism and Political Stability: The Soviet Case. *World Politics* 36

[45] Hale, 58

[46] For a comprehensive history of the Balkans and the formation of Yugoslavia, please see Mazower, *The Balkans*

[47] Kaufman, *Modern Hatreds* deals with this discussion in his chapter on elite-driven nationalism in Yugoslavia.

[48] Bunce, V. (1999b), 220

[49] Mueller, J. (2000) The Banality of "Ethnic War. *International Security* 25(1), 43

[50] See Mueller, *"The Banality of Ethnic War"* and Foer, F. (2004) *How Soccer Explains the World: An Unlikely Theory of Globalization*. New York: Harper-Collins. Further information on soccer supporters and paramilitary violence in Yugoslavia can be found in Note 54.

[51] Mazzei, 214.

[52] Bookman, M.Z. (1992) *The Economics of Secession*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

[53] Bookman, 8-9.

[54] Ramet, S. (1992) *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991* (2nd edition). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

[55] Lampe, J.R. (2000) *Yugoslavia as History: Twice there was a Country* (2nd edition), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[56] This information can be found at the BBC News website by searching the country profile pages. Serbia and Montenegro's page is still in existence with a search of the site.

[57] Ramet, (1992), 256-7

[58] A discussion of Arkan and Serb nationalism through the vehicle of soccer supporter's groups is found in Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia* (especially chapter 13) and Foer, *How Soccer Explains the World*. Essentially, Arkan's base was comprised mainly of Red Star Belgrade supporters, the most popular team in Serbia, which created a very natural paramilitary group given a multitude of young, perhaps undereducated men, who may have been coerced through alcohol.

[59] Mazzei, 23 and 213-214.

[60] Darmanovic, S. (2007) Montenegro: A miracle in the Balkans? *Journal of Democracy* 18(2)

[61] Montenegro declared their independence on 3 June 2006 which was followed by Serbia in 5 June 2006 which officially recognized Serbia's minimal contestation of Montenegrin independence. This meant that the international community could more comfortable proceed with fully recognizing Montenegro.

[62] Darmanovic, 155-6

[63] Judah, T. (2000) *The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 332

[64] For a comprehensive understanding of the breakup of Norway-Sweden, please see: Derry, T.K. (1973) *A History of Modern Norway, 1814-1872*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 61; Eckstein, H. (1966) *Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 4; Derry, T.K. (1957) *A Short History of Norway*, London: George Allen and Unwin Limited, 130-31; Larsen, K. (1950) *History of Norway*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 485; Derry, T.K. (1979) *A History of Scandinavia: Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Iceland*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 272; Popperwell, R.G. (1972) *Norway*, London: Ernest Benn Limited, 141.

[65] Derry, (1957) 130-1

[66] Popperwell, 141

[67] Bunce, V. (1999a, 1999b, 2004)